

MONEY POLITIC TO BOOST POLITICAL PARTY VOTE IN INDONESIAN GENERAL ELECTION OF 2019

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Abstract

Money politic strategy in each of general elections in Indonesia often becomes politicians' choice. It can be seen from the number of political parties participating in general election of 2009 detected to implement money politic strategy to the voters. This study was a quantitative research focusing on target group (voters) registration structure network and size of money politic fund. This research aimed to find out the effectiveness of money politic to boost political party vote in general election of 2019. The research involved 1.152 respondents with polling station. The result of analysis on 133 voting places showed the different effectiveness of political money for different political parties. Money politic contributed by 0.56% to the electoral vote, at significance level of 0.01.

Keywords: *General election, money politic, political party*

I. Introduction

General election plays a central role in a state's democratic system, including Indonesia. However, the organization of general election often finds constraint. One of constraints found frequently in Indonesia is the presence of money politics. Even, the chairperson of *Kawal Pemilu Kita* (KPK) of Central Java, Syaifudin Anwar, stated that considering the result of monitoring conducted by KPK network volunteers in Central Java 9th Electoral District (*Dapil Jateng IX*) most potential members of RI's Legislative Assembly in this Electoral District putatively conducted money politic. Some of electoral districts in Jateng IX are Brebes Regency, Tegal City, and Tegal Regency. Money politic practice was conducted by potential members of Legislative Assembly by distributing money to citizens during campaign¹.

This money politic is firmly prohibited. This prohibition concerning money politic has been explained in Law Number 7 of 2017, mentions that "potential members and/or campaign team, volunteer, or others are prohibited from promising and/or giving other materials to affect the organizer of election and/or electorates either directly or indirectly". The sanction accompanying this money politic is included in Law Number 8 of 2012 about General Election of Legislative Assembly, Local Representative Council, and Local

¹ Insetyonoto. 2019. KPK: *Sebagian Besar Caleg DPR Dapil Jateng IX Diduga Lakukan Politik Uang*, diakses pada 11 Maret 2020, dari <https://www.gatra.com/rubrik/nasional/pilkada-pilpres/405013-KPK:-Sebagian-Besar-Caleg-DPR-Dapil-Jateng-IX-Diduga-Lakukan-Politik-Uang>

Legislative Assembly members, as governed in Article 301 clause (3) stating that the actors of money politic can be imprisoned for 3 years and fined with IDR 36 millions at most.

It is also confirmed by Chairperson of General Election Commission (KPU), Arief Budiman, stating that doing *dawn attack* (distributing money in the morning before the election), money politic, and spreading hoax and calumny are prohibited. Those prohibitions have been included clearly in KPU's slogan². Although the regulation of money politic prohibition has been obvious, in fact, money politic practice is still found frequently.

It is confirmed further with the presence of sting operation against a member of Legislative Assembly (DPR), Bowo Sidik Pangarso. The arrest of Bowo and his assignment to be the suspect of bribery case proves the presence of money politic³. After the assignment of the suspect, Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) also found a proof cardboard containing money belonging to the suspect (former member of DPR from Golkar Fraction), Bowo Sidik Pangarso. The money would putatively be used for the dawn attack in General Election of 2019⁴.

The finding of money politic case indicates that Indonesian democratic system is still in trouble. Moreover, money politic often occurs due to the low consciousness of political participant in general election. People unaware of the importance of their vote tend to ignore the quality of potential legislative member they support. Therefore, they often reluctantly find out and even neglect the background of the potential members. Even, people often make general election an opportunity of looking for material by receiving money politic from the potential legislative members. On the other hand, the potential legislative member needing vote support will also utilize such condition to conduct vote buying.

The problems of money politic and low public participation will clearly reduce the quality of democracy in Indonesia. Illegal practice in general election shows people (community) and also potential legislative members with low political and democratic consciousness. Money politic affects the participants of general election so that potential members as if get strong legitimacy from people. In addition, public participation in general election, whether or not they will participate in voting, is also affected by money⁵.

Rusham's (2015) study found that money political practice flourishes in Indonesia because people view it as reasonable. It makes people insensitive to the money politic practice-related dangers. People do not perceive that money politic should be avoided

² Bayu Septianto. 2019. *Soal Politik Uang Jelang Pencoblosan, KPU: Dilarang Serangan Fajar*, accessed on March 1, 2020, from <https://tirto.id/soal-politik-uang-jelang-pencoblosan-kpu-dilarang-serangan-fajar-dkvd>

³Harris Fadhil. 2019. *BW: OTT KPK pada Bowo Sidik Bukti Politik Uang Bukan Isapan Jempol*, accessed on April 5, 2020, from <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4488826/bw-ott-kpk-pada-bowo-sidik-bukti-politik-uang-bukan-isapan-jempol>

⁴Nanda Perdana Putra. 2019. *KPK Bongkar Amplop Diduga untuk Serangan Fajar Bowo Sidik Apa yang Ditemukan?* Accessed on March 30, 2020, from <https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/3932651/kpk-bongkar-amplop-diduga-untuk-serangan-fajar-bowo-sidik-apa-yang-ditemukan>

⁵Jonasmer Simatupang, Muhammad Subekhan. 2018, *Pengaruh Budaya Politik Uang dalam Pemilu terhadap Keberlanjutan Demokrasi Indonesia*. Seminar Nasional Hukum Universitas Negeri Semarang. Volume 4 Number r 3 of 2018, 1927-1312.

normatively, so that they tend to let it⁶. It is in line with Rahmatiah HL's (2015) study finding that money politic occurring within community is encouraged more by the low political education the people receive and the lower-middle community's difficult economy.⁷

A recent survey conducted by Charta Politika on March 19-25, 2019 also showed that most people still consider the money politic practice in general election as reasonable. From the survey conducted, it can be found that 45.6 percents of respondents state they can understand money politic practice. Meanwhile, 39.1 percents state do not understand, and 15.4 percents do not know or do not answer.⁸ It indicates that many people neither understand that money politic is an illegal deed nor know its negative effect.

The prevalent money politic is confirmed by the data found by Republic of Indonesia Police's Public Relation Bureau. The chairperson of Bureau, Brigjen Pol Dedi Prasetyo, stated that the party has found 31 money politic-related cases. This case is now investigated by Integrated Law Enforcement Center (*Sentra Penegakan Hukum Terpadu* or Gakkumdu)⁹. Although many people have been caught for committing money politic practice, in fact it still occurs frequently.

Even a number of general election monitors states that money politic practice in legislative general election of 2009 is considered as still massive, vulgar, and even brutal, compared with that previously. This condition has ever been investigated by ICW (Indonesia Corruption Watch) as a non-governmental organization having mission to supervise and to report the corruption action to the public. ICW found that the size of national money politic occurs in general election of 2009 is higher than that in 2004. Moreover, the data found by LSI's survey in 2009 also indicates that money politic case increases by 11.9 percents.

Indonesia also implements local election simultaneously in 2018. General Election Supervisory Agency (*Bawaslu*) pays special attention to money politic case during the organization of local election. As a result, 35 money politic cases are reported to occur during simultaneous local election in 171 regions. This finding obviously shows that money politic practice still occurs prevalently today.

Many findings of research on money politic practice encourage the author to conduct an in-depth study on money politic model at local legislative member election level. This research aims to prove the effectiveness of money politic in improving political party electability and or potential local legislative members in Indonesia. The result of research is, of course, not intended to be generalized nationally because it is limited to one of small towns

⁶Rusham. 2015. *Faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi munculnya money politics*. PARADIGMA Vol:XXI/No, 01 July 2015, p. 85

⁷ Rahmatiah, 2015. *Sikap dan Pengetahuan Masyarakat Terhadap Money Politic Dalam Pemilu Legislatif*. Accessed on March 1, 2020 from http://journal.uin-alauddin.ac.id/index.php/al_daulah/article/viewFile/1491/1439

⁸Ihsanuddin. 2019. *Survei Charta Politika: 45,6 Persen Responden Maklumi Politik Uang*. Accessed on March 2, 2020, from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/04/05/09373051/survei-charta-politika-456-persen-responden-maklumi-politik-uang>.

⁹Christoforus Ristiano. 2019. *Polri Sebut Sudah Ada 31 Kasus Terkait Politik Uang*, accessed on March 19, 2020, from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/04/04/12251841/polri-sebut-sudah-ada-31-kasus-terkait-politik-uang>

only in Central Java Province. This research attempts to see how the money politic practice boost political party's vote.

The main theory of money politic refers to the theory developed by Karl Marx. Karl Marx states that human being is *homo economicus* or materialistic. It results in economic problems due to capitalism problem. This view is supported by Simmel's observation indicating that modern human puts money to be their main goal. Meanwhile, actually money is a human's means of supporting his/her life sustainability only. The position of money as human's main life goal likely results in negative effect on individuals, such as cynicism.

Other effects of materialistic view can be seen in the presence of reduced human life values. For example, it leads most people to value anything based on money and consider money as everything (Rahmatiah HL; 2015; Jonasmer Simatupang; Muhammad Subekhan, 2018). This condition also affects the democratic process in politics. In general election case, it leads to the emergence of money politic. Most people prioritize more material benefit they receive individually from the potential legislative members than their political right. Similarly, potential legislative members wanting the winning in general election utilize it by performing money politic.

Several forms of money politic are implemented. Jonasmer Simatupang and Muhammad Subekhan (2018) suggested the form of money politics: (1) Money. Its circulation usually improves during the organization of general election; (2) public facility. Parsudi Suparlan (1992) stated that there is no conferral (grant) for free; (3) mass mobilization.

The form of money politic has also been suggested by Bayu Dwi Anggono, in discussion held by *Jaringan Pemuda Peduli Demokrasi (JPPD)* (or Youth Network Caring about Democracy) in Jakarta, Monday, on July 30, 2018. They said that there are five money politic models: (1) transaction between elite capitalist and potential couple; (2) transaction between potential couple and political party; (3) transaction between potential couple and general election organizers; and (4) transaction between potential couple and electorates; and transaction between local leaders and constitutional judge.

This money politic practice often occurs in developing countries following democratic principle. Even, it is suggested that democratic regime in developing countries is colored with money politic widely. Money politic is considered to be the key element in electoral mobilization in many countries, called democracy's third wave ¹(a term used by Samuel P Hangtinton (1991)¹⁰.

This phenomenon encourages researchers to analyze the money politic phenomenon occurring in many countries. Muhtadi (2013) has reported some researches on money politic phenomenon in many continents:

- a) Brian M. Faughnan and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister conducted in Latin American and Caribbean areas entitled "Vote Buying in the Americas", Americas Barometer Insights, 2011.

¹⁰ Burhanuddin Muhtadi, 2013; *Money Politics And Electoral Dynamics In Indonesia: A Preliminary study Of The Interaction Between "Party-Id" And Patron-Client*; Jurnal Penelitian Politik | Volume 10 No. 1 June 2013 | 41-58

- b) “*Social Weather Stations: National Survey*”, Quezon City, Philippines, 2002, a research conducted in Philippine.
- c) A research conducted in Thailand and Taiwan by Kuen-Shan Cheng et al., entitled “Analysis of the Causes of Vote Buying, and the Study of How to Prevent It”, as cited in Frederic Charles Schaffer, “Vote Buying in East Asia”, in *Global CorruptionRep* 2004.
- d) A research conducted in Brazil concerning vote trading as the key element of contemporary politic. Frances Hagopian, *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
- e) A research in Argentina, written by Javier Auyero, in “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account,” *Latin American Studies Association*, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2000, pp. 55-81.
- f) A research conducted in African states such as Ghana, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Benin, and Senegal, and Botswana reported by Josephine T. Andrews and Kris Inman, in “Explaining Vote Choice in Africa’s Emerging Democracies”

The foundation of money politic idea follows “Patron-Client Theory”. Muhtadi (2013) explained the main factor encouraging the emergence of money politic in many countries. Patron-client theory has been used in analyzing this money politic before by such researchers as Scheiner, “Clientelism in Japan: The Importance and Limits of Institutional Explanations”¹¹; Herbert Kitschelt, “The Demise of Clientelism in Affluent Capitalist Democracies”¹²; Joongi Kim, “Clientelism and Corruption in South Korea”¹³; Carolyn Warner, “Mass Parties and Clientelism in France and Italy”¹⁴, and C.H. Lande, “Political Clientelism in Political Studies: Retrospect and Prospect”¹⁵.

In addition to patron-client pattern, money politic is also closely related to Party-ID. Not all people have party-ID they support. Some of them do not have party-ID, in the sense of not supporting certain parties fully. It is these people with low party-ID who contribute to the prevalence of money politic at community level.

When party-ID is getting lower, an individual will more likely accept money politic practice. It is because he can choose any party most beneficial to him freely. Otherwise, when an individual have higher party-ID, he will less likely accept the presence of money politic practice generally. The problem is that trend party-ID is getting lower over time in Indonesia. More people have no party-ID.

Public trust in party is fluctuating over time. This descending trend is affected by the party’s poor performance in the electorate’s eyes. Listening to much news about corruption cases involving party elites, the public becomes skeptical with political party. People

¹¹ Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson (Eds.). 2007. *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007, pp. 276-297

¹² Herbert Kitschelt & Steven Wilkinson (Eds.), *ibid.*, pp. 298-321

¹³ Stephen Kotkin dan Andras Sajo (Eds.). 2002. *Political Corruption in Transition: A Skeptic’s Handbook*, Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2002, pp. 167-185

¹⁴ Simona Piattoni, Clientelism. 2001. *Interests and Democratic Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 122-151.

¹⁵ C.H. Lande, 1993. *Political Clientelism in Political Studies: Retrospect and Prospect*. *International Political Science Review*, 4, 4, 1993, pp.440

expecting a clean and just political party become more skeptical. They are confused to determine they party-ID because they find difficultly the ideal party they expect.

This condition of course requires political party to conduct self-reform. Or otherwise, electorates will leave party-ID matter and political party. If it occurs, politic cost will be higher, because electorates tend to use transactional approach to vote the party. From this fact, it can be concluded that the prevalent money politic phenomenon is also triggered by the political party's failure in improving its performance in the electorates' eyes.

Local wisdom culture is suggested by Handayani (2004) explaining about the character of Javanese letters "*ha - na - ca - ra - ka*" in diplomacy. Followed with *sandangan pangku*, Javanese letter will the word-final (of consonants not followed by a vowel). Similarly, being treated well, Javanese people will be melted (assimilated), fluid, and able to adapt to situation and condition, rather than like hard and rigid stone. Money politic is a diplomatic media in Javanese culture. It is defined as the attempt of *mangku* (lapping). Good deed will make the electorates melted, and following the one treating them well.

II. Method

This research was conducted in a city belonging to Central Java area. To avoid "legal" complexity of research deliberately disguises the name of city into *Kota Trajumas* (Trajumas City)¹⁶, a city divided into four general electoral districts. The addressing of electoral district (*dapil*) is corresponding to sub district areas. They are disguised once more time: *dapil - 1 Mukti*; *dapil - 2 Rejo*; *dapil - 3 Mulyo*, and *dapil - 4 Tritis*.

The unit of analysis used in this research was polling station. Referring to data released by General Election Commission (KPU), there are 130,619 electorates distributed in 391 polling stations. This research took 128 polling stations as the sample of research. This sample is called survey location point (SLP). Nine (9) respondents were taken randomly from each of SLP. Random sampling technique was conducted using final vote list (DPT) as the sampling framework. This sampling technique is called random sampling technique. Thus, overall, 1,152 electorates were involved in this research distributed in 128 SLPs as respondent. Meanwhile, this sample size has fulfilled the margin of error criteria of 3.5%, at significance level with high density.

Data collection was carried out using direct interview technique, *face - to - face interview*, guided with closed-end questionnaire. Bivariate correlation statistic analysis technique is used to see the effectiveness of money politic strategy in improving electoral political party and or potential legislative members.

III Result and Discussion

Money politic is an important phenomenon in a democratic state. The use of money politic by political parties indicates the low quality of democracy in the state. On the other hand, the successful implementation of general election also indicates a successful

¹⁶ It is in line with Clifford Geertz, 1961, "*The Religion of Java*" Bibliovault OAI Responsitory, The University of Chicago Press. The term "Mojokuto" is used to mark the masterpiece research location. The categorization of religion belief is introduced for the first time in Java in: *santri, priyayi dan abangan*.

democracy. General election and money political still occurring massively in Indonesia suggest that Indonesia should reform its democratic implementation. Political parties have severe duty to reform it by drawing public's attention to and participation within it.

This research finds the implementation of money politic strategy conducted in some stages. These stages are important as they affect the effectiveness of money politic implemented. Political party, in choosing to undertake money politic, of course expects to obtain a large number of votes as much as possible. It is this that encourages money politic strategy to be undertaken in organized and systematic manner.

1. Electorate Registration Strategy

Money politic strategy is implemented first by potential legislative member by conducting registration. Winning team and or political party cadre visit the potential electorates to ask them to be registered as the potential electorates of legislative member they promote. They (the winning team) come from the neighborhood of potential electorates. It is intended to facilitate the duty implementation. Before visiting the potential electorates, the winning team makes a profile of people in the same village that can be approached and registered. They work carefully.

They do each step with thorough consideration. Team may not do registration error. It means that team cannot register the people who have chosen or are cadre of competitor legislative member or political party. It will, of course, reduce the opportunity of obtaining vote. This step also indicates that money politic is attempted to achieve maximum level in its effectiveness of achieving the public vote. They should ensure that much money spent can result in the large number of votes as well.

The result of research shows that the number of respondents recognizing the registration is smaller (44%) than that not recognizing the registration (56%). This difference of value (12%) is not too wide. It means that there is actually an electorate registering strategy directed or intended to vote certain legislative member or political party.

This data also explains that money politic is conducted in structured manner. The committee or winning team is established by all electoral districts. It is mainly in charge of registering neighbors, relatives, and surrounding people, and then expanding to other areas. A multilevel marketing-like model can be used to expand the mission of registration. This structure is mainly aimed at ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of political fund distribution.

Registration can be conducted effectively when the register is acquainted with the registered one. Patron-client model is applied since the beginning of money politic strategy implementation. It becomes a strategy to improve the effectiveness of money politic implemented.

2. Size of Money Politic

Winning team will visit the potential electorates and register them when it has been sure that the potential electorates are nearly certainly willing to follow the purpose and goal of registration. The attempt of visiting the potential electorates is usually taken during leisure time or between daily activities. It can be in the evening or following the dusk. They do not

attract many people's attention. The registration is conducted in disguised manner. If it is conducted prominently, it will disrupt their mission. Somehow they realize that this registration activity as the early step of money politic strategy is illegal. The close relationship between the register and registered one makes the mission implemented successfully. Visiting the people's houses, winning team will ask the host's willingness to be enlisted as the potential voters for the potential legislative members from certain party. This question about the willingness to be enlisted is merely chit chat to open the communication ethics. The register has estimated whether or not the host will approve the registration. The heart of registration communication lies not on the aspect of willingness, but on the amount of money promised when they want to be enlisted or to be directed to vote according to the register's want.

To ask the amount of money promised, the author proposed an opened-end question: *"Could I know, how much money is promised by the potential legislative members to the voters in your residence surrounding?"* The respondents are told to mention the amount of money promised. The respondents willing to tell it say that the lowest value is IDR 40,000, and the highest one is IDR 300,000. The **first highest value** promised in money politic registration is IDR.100,000 (41%), the **second** is IDR 50,000 (36%); and the **third** is IDR 200,000 (10%). Meanwhile the other frequency of money politic value is relatively small: IDR 75,000,- (6%); IDR 150,000,- (5%), IDR 300,000,- (1%) and IDR 40,000,- less than 1%.

We also asked the respondents their aspiration about money politic size. We classified the answer into seven groups ranging between IDR 50,000 and \leq IDR 200,000. Considering the aspiration of potential voters, the **first highest value** promised in money politic registration is IDR 150,000 (30%); **the second** is IDR 200,000 (26%); **the third** is IDR 100.000 (23%); and **the fourth** is IDR 250.000,- (14%). The rest is IDR 50,000 (5%), and IDR 125,000 (3%).

Data shows that the aspiration of money politic size aspiration suggested by potential voters is not much different from the amount of money promised by the winning team of potential legislative members and or political party. It means that the potential voters' aspiration about the size of money politic is compatible to the amount of money promised. The median of money politic value in general election of 2019 in Trajumas City is IDR 100,000.

It is confirmed by respondents' perception on money politic size of IDR 100,000. The respondents told the respondents: "The promise of giving the voters willing to be enlisted to be the potential voters of certain contestant is prevalent around the general election. If the amount of money promised is IDR 100,000 (a hundred thousand rupiah), what do you think?" Most respondents answered that it has been **reasonable (72%) and more than enough (9%)**, while the rest answered that it is **not enough(19%)**.

Data on the size of money politic fund is determined by public agreement. Referring to the market theory about price, price is the balance between supply and demand. This condition can be explained because Indonesian economic condition post reform was more dominant than political condition. The more dominant economy encourages the shift of political logic (interest) into economic logic. Politic formerly activated for people collectivity

shifts and is replaced with the logic of “demand” and “supply”. In this condition, people’s vote is not more than “goods” or “commodity”.¹⁷

It is also this condition that enables the money politic to show high effectiveness. This economic domination predisposition, according to Jonathan Pugh (2009), is due to the strengthening of neoliberalism in autonomous government inside human beings, particularly post-reform. As a result, the deregulation of life ethos occurs impacting on fundamental degradation on environment and social life establishment. It is a factor encouraging the prevalence of money politic in Indonesia, so that the implementation of money politic is no longer strange in Indonesian democracy¹⁸.

In the case of money politic, there are price, demand, and supply. But the position of supply and demand between winning team and voter is still unclear. In a certain case, the winning team network is positioned to be demand and the voters to be supply. But it can be otherwise in another case.

3. Political Party Implements *Money Politic* strategy

Sixteen political parties participated in the contestation of Indonesian general election in 2019 in Trajumas City: (1) *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB or National Awakening Party); (2) *Partai Indonesia Raya* (Gerindra or the Great Indonesia Movement Party); (3) *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (PDI – P or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle); (4) *Partai Golongan Karya* (Golkar or Party of Functional Groups); (5) *Partai Nasional Demokrat* (Nasdem or National Democrat Party); (6) *Partai Garuda* (PG or Garuda Party); (7) *Partai Berkarya* (PB or Work Party); (8) *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS or Prosperous Justice Party); (9) *Partai Persatuan Indonesia* (Perindo or Indonesia Unity Party); (10) *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP or Development Unity Party); (11) *Partai Solidaritas Indonesia* (PSI or Indonesia Solidarity Party); (12) *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN or National Mandate Party); (13) *Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat* (Hanura or People Conscience Party); (14) *Partai Demokrat* (PD or Democrat Party); (15) *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB or Moon Star Party); (16) *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia* (PKPI or Indonesia Justice and Unity Party). These sixteen political parties are divided into two groups: incumbent and newcomer political parties. Majorities are incumbents, while there are only newcomers: *Partai Garuda*, *Partai Berkarya*, *Partai Persatuan Indonesia*, and *Partai Solidaritas Indonesia*.

The main research problem is what are political parties implementing money politic in Indonesian general election in 2019 in Trajumas City? All research problems put this question in the end. It is because good relationship and communication have been established between data collecting team and respondents, so that respondents are willing to answer the question. We realize that this question is very sensitive. Therefore, we put it in the end. We ask the respondents: “May I know, which potential legislative members coming from what party collecting the data and or promising transportation money when you vote them?”

¹⁷ Nurus Shalihin Djamra. 2011. *Politik Rabun Ayam: Wajah Baru Demokrasi Indonesia*. Jurnal Analisis Politik, Volume I, No 1, 2011

¹⁸ Pugh, Jonathan (pnyt). 2009. *What is Radical Politics Today?*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Not all respondents were willing to answer this question. Only 17% out of 1,152 respondents were. Nevertheless, the author assumes that 17% respondents willing to answer this question are important, to find out whether or not the political party implemented money politic. The number of the frequency of respondents answering is not too important. Even when only one respondent answers that certain political party did it, the author believes that the answer is valid.

Table 1 Distribution of Polling Station Number and Distribution of each Political Parties detected to implement money politic in Salatiga City

Political Parties detected to implement money politic	Electoral District 1		Electoral District 2		Electoral District 3		Electoral District 4		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
PKB	1	3%			2	6%			3	2%
GERINDRA	1	3%	7	21%	8	24%	6	17%	22	17%
PDI - P	8	26%	9	27%	6	18%	9	26%	32	24%
GOLKAR			8	24%	1	3%	2	6%	11	8%
NASDEM	1	3%	5	15%	1	3%	7	20%	14	11%
PKS			3	9%	4	12%	1	3%	8	6%
PERINDO			2	6%	1	3%	1	3%	4	3%
PPP	2	6%		0%		0%			2	2%
PAN			3	9%	6	18%	1	3%	10	8%
DEMOKRAT			6	18%	4	12%	6	17%	16	12%
Number of Sample Polling Station/Survey Location Point)	31		33		34		35		133	

Source: Primary Data, 2019

The data shown in table 1 indicates that ten political parties are detected to perform money politic in Trajumas City. Meanwhile, political parties undetected to do so are: (1) *Partai Garuda*; (2) *Partai Berkarya*; (3) *Partai Solidaritas Indonesia*; (4) *Partai Hamura*; (5) *Partai Bulan Bintang*; and (6) *PKPI*. The six political parties undetected to perform money politic could not position their representatives on the legislative assembly's seat.

Considering the data on the percentage money politic detected and the legislative seat gain of each political party, (1) *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI – P)* is the one with highest mean value in the detection of money politic strategy implementation, in which it gains 8 legislative seats in 24% of polling station; (2) *Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Partai Gerindra)* is detected to perform money politic in 17% of polling stations and gains 4 seats; (3) *Partai Demokrat (PD)* is detected to perform money politic in 12% of polling stations and gains 3 seats; (4) *Partai Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem)* is detected to perform money politic in 11% of polling stations and gains 1 seat; (5) *Partai Golongan Karya (PG)* is

detected to perform money politic in 8% of polling stations and gain 1 seat; (6) Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) is detected to perform money politic in 8% of polling stations and gains no seat; (7) *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)* is detected to perform money politic in 6% of polling stations and gain 4 seats; (8) Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) is detected to perform money politic in 2% of polling stations and gain 4 seats; (9) Partai Persatuan Indonesia (Perindo) is detected to perform money politic in 3% of polling stations and gain no seat; and (10) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) is detected to perform money politic in 2% of polling stations and gain no seat.

Table 2 Distribution of Political Party's Vote and Local Legislative Seat Gains

Political Party	Electoral District 1		Electoral District 2		Electoral District 3		Electoral District 4		Number of Seat
	Money Politic	Vote	Money Politic	Vote	Money Politic	Vote	Money Politic	Vote	
PKB	1	2883	0	4339	2	2557	0	3284	4
GERINDRA	1	2428	7	2586	8	4054	6	3047	4
PDI - P	8	12220	9	8862	6	10298	9	7803	8
GOLKAR	0	402	8	2093	1	789	2	4095	1
NASDEM	1	231	5	3739	1	1724	7	308	1
PKS	0	3323	3	3931	4	2348	1	4030	4
PERINDO	0	124	2	1136	1	973	1	211	0
PPP	2	2311	0	1031	0	195	0	2225	0
PAN	0	912	3	505	6	259	1	600	0
DEMOKRAT	0	1162	6	3683	4	4041	6	3161	3

Source: Primary Data (2019) &: <https://pemilu2019.kpu.go.id/#/dprdkab/penetapan-hasil/wilayah/>

Data of research shows the different effectiveness level of money politic strategy between political parties. PDI – P is detected to occupy the highest rank in money politic implementation with the largest number of voters and legislative seats gained. PAN is detected to perform more money politic than PKS and PKB, but PAN unsuccessfully

positions its representative on the legislative seat. Nasdem is detected to perform substantial money politic but can gain 1 (one) seat only.

So far we can choose the data existing in the two important variable channels: money politic (X) as independent variable and political party electability (Y) as independent variable. We use polling station as the unit of analysis, distributed in four electoral districts. There are 40 observation cases to be analyzed using bivariate correlation simple statistic analysis. This feature is contained in SPSS Version 18.

Correlations

		X	Y
X	Pearson Correlation	1	.563**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	40	40
Y	Pearson Correlation	.563**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	40	40

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The result of statistic test shows the significant effect of X on Y variable wit score of 0.563, at significance level of 0.01. This figure explains that money politic strategy performed by political parties affects significantly the vote gain, by 56.3%. This figure is fairly high to conclude how effective the money politic is in boosting political party vote in Indonesian General Election of 2019. The data obtained shows that money politic effectively improves the political party vote gain in general election. However, the effectiveness value of money politic can affect differently the vote gain of individual political parties.

IV. Conclusion

Money politic strategy often occurs in Indonesian general election. In the general election of 2019, money politic action was performed by many political parties. Through this study, the author attempted to elaborate the relationship between money politic and success in general election. The result of research showed the effectiveness of money politic to the vote gain in the general election of 2019. It can be concluded that the effectiveness or the effect of money politic on vote gain is 0.56%, significant at 0.01 level. It means money politic performed by political parties can affect the vote gain in general election, despite with different effect dependent on the political parties.

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